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This paper proposes a modi®ed version of the standard search and
matching model of the labour market that combines a shirking mechanism
with the assumption that ®rms post wages. We argue that a small shirking
eect will generate a low rate of pro®t and lead to a low rate of vacancy
creation, implying that the vacancy ®lling rate is high. Through this
mechanism we show that our model delivers a close match of the simulated
volatilities, correlations and autocorrelations of unemployment, vacancies,
labour market tightness and the job ®nding rate with values observed in
US data. In doing so, it outperforms prominent alternative models.
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Although the currently dominant approach to modelling labour markets, the
search frictions model pioneered by, among others, Diamond (1982), Mortensen
and Pissarides (1994) and Pissarides (2000), provides a simple framework for
the analysis of the labour market and associated policy issues, it has some
well-known diYculties. In the most prominent statement of these diYculties,
Shimer (2005) compares the volatilities, autocorrelations and correlations of un-
employment, vacancies, labour market tightness and the job ®nding rate from
a calibrated and simulated version of the search frictions model with US data
for 1951-2003. Two ®ndings stand out. The simulated volatilities of these key
labour market variables are much lower than those observed in the data. And the
model cannot match the autocorrelation of vacancies or the co-movements of va-
cancies with other labour market variables. The inability of the search frictions
model to match the cyclical behaviour of labour market variables, the unemploy-
ment volatility puzzle, has been extensively analysed by a large and growing
literature (e.g. Hall, 2005, Hall and Milgrom, 2008, Hagedorn and Manovskii,
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2008, Gertler and Trigari, 2009, Pissarides, 2009, Rogerson and Shimer, 2010,
Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2016, Christiano et al, 2016). The particular weakness
of the search frictions model in explaining vacancies has received less attention.
This paper argues that these weaknesses can be addressed by a modi®ed
version of the search frictions model that incorporates a shirking mechanism
and which assumes that wages are determined through wage posting rather
than by worker-®rm bargaining. Shirking arises because ®rms have imperfect
information about the eort exerted by workers; we model this by assuming
®rms have an exogenous probability of detecting and ®ring a shirking worker.
This implies that workers must balance the utility bene®ts of shirking against
the costs, in the form of a higher probability of becoming unemployed. The
optimal choice of a wage posting ®rm is therefore to set the wage at the lowest
value that induces the worker to choose not to shirk (Shapiro and Stiglitz,
1984); the no-shirking constraint. Calibrating and simulating this model using,
where possible, standard values from the literature, we can closely match the
volatilities of unemployment, vacancies and labour market tightness and can also
match the autocorrelation of vacancies and the correlations between vacancies
and the other variables. Our calibration assumes a small shirking eect as the
utility bene®t of shirking is small and the probability of detection is high. This
small friction is suYcient to generate a large volatility of unemployment and
other labour market variables.
The model delivers substantial volatility of unemployment through a mech-
anism similar to that highlighted by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008). In our
model, the shirking eect leads ®rms to set a relatively high wage. Combined
with the assumption of free entry of ®rms, this implies that pro®ts are low. This
implies that ®rms put few resources into recruiting, posting only a small num-
ber of vacancies. Since vacancies are low relative to the number of unemployed
workers, vacancies are ®lled quickly. This high vacancy ®lling rate implies that
hiring is highly sensitive to the number of vacancies; as a consequence, variations
in job vacancies in response to shocks lead to large variations in unemployment1 
Since a low rate of pro®t implies that vacancies are highly sensitive to ouput,
unemployment is highly sensitive to productivity shocks In the standard search
frictions model, volatilities of key labour market variables comparable to those
observed in the data are only obtained if workers have very little bargaining
power and if the value of leisure is large (Hagedorn and Makovskii, 2008). This
is problematic as it is not consistent with standard calibrated parameter values
used in the literature2. In our model, large volatilities are obtained using using
standard parameter calibrations3.
1Amaral et al (2016) emphasise the importance of a high vacancy-®lling rate in addressing
the unemployment volatility puzzle. The low simulated vacancy-®lling rate obtained in Shimer
(2005) is central in generating small volatilities of unemployment and vacancies.
2Other extensions of the standard search frictions model also imply low pro®ts. For ex-
ample, Pissarides (2009) introduces a ®xed cost of matching in addition to costs of posting
vacancies and Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer (2013) introduce credit frictions.
3Ljungqvist and Sargent (2016) argue that a small value for the fundamental surplus,
the surplus of output over the minimum value of the wage that is consistent with positive
output, is required in order to address the unemployment volatility puzzle; we explore this in
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There is a robust body of evidence supporting the existence of shirking
eects (Wolfers and Zilinsky, 2015). Burda et al (2015) analyse empirical mea-
sures of shirking and argue that the data are consistent with a model in which
"workers are paid eYciency wages to refrain from loa®ng on the job." Groshen
and Krueger (1990) and Rebitzer (2005) ®nd an inverse relationship between
wages and monitoring costs. Capelli and Chauvin (1991) and Reich et al (2003)
®nd that ®rms take less disciplinary action against workers in workplaces where
relative wages are higher. Pfeifer (2010) and Zhang et al (2013) ®nd that absen-
teeism is inversely related to wages. Malcomson and Mavroeidis (2010) estimate
aggregate wage equations on U.S time series data and argue that their estimates
are consistent with the shirking model. The potential of a shirking mechanism
in explaining the unemployment volatility puzzle has been raised previously
in the literature, for example by Rogerson and Shimer (2010). Costain and
Jansen (2009) develop a model with a shirking mechanism but, in contrast to
our approach, assume that wages are determined through bargaining. They
®nd that this model does not help address the unemployment volatility puzzle.
Uhlig and Xu (1996) assess the ability of a dierent type of eYciency wage
model4 to explain large cyclical movements in unemployment using a real busi-
ness cycle model without search frictions5. A related strand of the literature
(e.g. Danthine and Donaldson,1990 and Danthine and Kurmann, 2010) incor-
porates eYciency wage eects into DSGE models but does not investigate the
unemployment volatility puzzle.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We outline our model in
section 2). We discuss calibration and present our results in Section 3). Section
4) sumarises and raises issues for subsequent research.
  
We use a stochastic discrete time version of the search frictions model.
 
There is a continuum of identical workers on the unit interval. In period t
a worker is in one of three states, employed and not shirking, employed and
shirking or unemployed. All employed workers suer a disutility6 of c; workers
who do not shirk incur additional disutility of e. The value function for a worker
who is employed and not shirking is
Lt = wt  c e+ 1
1 + r
Et[(1  t)Mt +  tUt] (1)
section 3.4) below.
4They assume that eort is a continuous function of the wage, similar to Solow (1979).
5Poeschel (2010) uses a model with shirking and wage posting to analyse the "Diamond
Paradox" (Diamond, 1971); his model diers from ours in several respacts, including the
possibility that ®rms might renege on the wage they oer in order to recruit workers.
6Following Hall (2005), this might equivalently be modeled as the utility of leisure enjoyed
only by the unemployed.
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where Mt = max(Lt, St) and S is the value function for a worker who is em-
ployed and shirking. This worker earns (and consumes) real wage wt and ex-
periences disutility of working7 of c + e. The job match dissolves at the end
of the period with exogenous but time-varying probability  t. We assume that
the separation rate is stochastic:  t = ee
t
 ; t is a separation rate shock where
t = 
t + h

t and h

t is distributed as N(0, s

 ). Although the worker does
not currently shirk, they may choose to do so in the next period, if the job
match survives. The value function for a worker who is employed and shirking
is
St = wt  c+ 1
1 + r
Et[(1  t  d)Mt + ( t + d)Ut] (2)
where the worker is detected as shirking and ®red with exogenous probability
d. Compared to a non-shirker, this worker incurs less disutility while at work
but has a higher probability of becoming unemployed. The value function for
an unemployed worker is
Ut = b+
1
1 + r
Et[ftMt + (1 ft)Ut] (3)
where b denotes real unemployment bene®ts. If unemployed, an individual ®nds
a job and is employed in the next period with endogenous probability ft.
The worker will choose not to shirk if and only if Lt  St. This implies the
No-Shirking Constraint
Lt  Ut  (1 + r) e
d
(4)
If the utility premium of workers who are employed and not shirking over unem-
ployed workers does not satisfy this condition, the utility bene®t from shirking
exceeds the risk-weighted cost from a higher likelihood of becoming unemployed.
 
There is a continuum of identical ®rms on the unit interval. Each ®rm can hire
up to one worker and a ®rm with an employed and non-shirking worker produces
an amount yt, where yt = ee
s
 ; st is a technology shock, where 
s
t = 
sst + h
s
t
and hst is distributed as N(0, s

s). Output is zero if the worker shirks. The value
function of a ®lled job with a non-shirking worker is
Jt = yt  wt + 1
1 + r
Et[(1  t)Ht +  tVt] (5)
where V is the value function of a vacancy, H = J if the worker chooses not
to shirk and H = F otherwise. F is the value function of a ®lled job with a
shirking worker, given by
Ft = wt + 1
1 + r
Et[(1  t  d)Ht + ( t + d)Vt] (6)
7Our approach diers slightly from Burda et al (2015), who assign a utility bene®t to
shirking whereas we assign a utility cost to not shirking. This alternative approach leads to
the same results.
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The value function for a vacant job is
Vt = g + 1
1 + r
Et[qtHt + (1 qt)Vt] (7)
Firms must pay a real cost of g to post a vacancy. Vacancies are then ®lled at
the start of the next period with probability q. We follow the timing convention
of Gertler et al (2009) and assume that new job matches become productive
immediately if the worker chooses not to shirk.
We assume free entry of ®rms, so Vt = 0. This implies that the value function
for vacancies simpli®es to
Ht = (1 + r)
g
qt
(8)
and so the value function for a ®lled job with a non-shirking worker becomes
(1 + r)
g
qt
= yt  wt + (1  t)Et g
qt
(9)
or
yt = wt + lt (10)
where lt = g[(1 + r) q  (1  t)Et q ] is the real cost of hiring a worker.
   
The labour market is characterised by search frictions. Aggregate hiring is
determined by the matching function
t = mu
a
t v
a
t (11)
where  is the number of workers hired, u is the unemployment rate and v is the
vacancy rate. m and a are parameters characterising the matching function.
De®ning labour market tightness as
t =
vt
ut
(12)
the matching function can also be written as
t = mut
a
t (13)
The vacancy ®lling rate, the probability of a ®rm ®lling a vacancy, is
qt =
t
vt
= mat (14)
while the job ®nding rate, the probability that an unemployed worker ®nds a
job, is
ft =
t
ut
= tqt (15)
5
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The ®rm chooses the wage. It will choose the lowest wage compatible with no
shirking, so Lt = St and Ht = Jt. From (4) the wage is determined by
Lt  Ut = (1 + r) e
d
(16)
Combining (1) and (3) to give
Lt  Ut = wt  e b c+ 1
1 + r
(1  t  ft)Et(Lt  Ut) (17)
and using (16), the wage is
wt = b+ c+ e+
e
d
(r +  t + ft) (18)
This generalises the wage equation derived by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) to
account for search frictions. In order to understand the implications of this wage
equation, it is useful to make a comparison with the standard search frictions
model with wage bargaining. That model is obtained if there is no utility
premium to shirking, e = 0, and if wages are determined through worker-®rm
bargaining. Denoting the relative bargaining power of workers as  , the wage
can then be expressed as (e.g. Mortensen and Nagypal, 2007)
wt = (yt + gt) + (1 )(b+ c) (19)
In contrast to the standard search frictions model, the wage in (18) does not
depend on the level of output and is a function of the job ®nding rate of unem-
ployed workers rather than of labour market tightness.
 
 
 
 
In calibration, where possible, we follow earlier studies. Thus all parameters, ex-
cept those speci®c to the shirking mechanism, are calibrated using values taken
from the literature. The remaining parameters, d and e, are chosen so that our
model matches the average values of the unemployment rate and labour mar-
ket tightness in US data. We simulate our model using stochastic processes for
productivity and job separation shocks that match those observed in the data.
We then compare simulated volatilities for the unemployment rate, vacancies,
labour market tightness and the rate at which unemployed workers ®nd a job
with the data based measures presented in Shimer (2005)8.
8There are two approaches to simulation in the literature. In the ®rst (used by, among
others, Shimer, 2005 and Hall, 2005), productivity can take a number of discrete values, where
transition between productivity values is described by a Markov process. The model is solved
for each simulated value of productivity. In the second (used by, among others, Rogerson
and Shimer, 2010, Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer, 2013 and Gertler et al, 2015), the model
is linearised around the steady-state and then simulated. In this paper, we follow the second
approach.
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   
We normalize a time period to be one quarter. Our calibrated parameter values
are outlined in Table 1). The discount rate is set as r = 1%. The average job
separation rate is  = 0.1, following Shimer (2005) and Hall (2005); this implies
that on average 3.3% of employed workers exit employment every month9. The
cost of posting a vacancy is set as g = 0.213, following Shimer (2005)10 . Real
unemployment bene®ts are set as b = 0.4. This is the same value as Shimer
(2005)11 . The disutility of labour is assumed to be c = 0.43. This is the
value of leisure estimated by Hall (2006). For the matching function, we follow
Pissarides (2009) and assume m = 2.112 and follow Petrongolo and Pissarides
(2001) by assuming a = 0.5.
Table 1 Values of Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Interpretation Value
 Separation Rate 0.1
r Risk-Free Interest Rate 0.01
y Labour productivity 1
b Unemployment Bene®t 0.4
g Vacancy Cost 0.213
u Utility of Leisure 0.43
m Matching CoeYcient 2.1
a Matching Elasticity 0.5
 Detection Rate 0.94
e Disutility of Eort 0.06
For the processes driving productivity and job separations shocks, we assume
s = 0.733 and  = 0.875 for the autoregressive component and ss = 0.05 and
s = 0.01 for the volatilities of the underlying shocks. These values gener-
ate shocks that match the autocorrelations and standard deviations of labour
productivity and job separation in U.S data for 1951-2003 reported in Shimer
(2005)13 .
There are no previous calibrations of parameters comparable to e and d in
the literature. We solve the model comprising (10)-(15) and (18) in steady-state,
together with the condition fu = (1 u), using the parameter values in Table
1). We select values of e and d for which the solution gives values of u and
9 In the literature, monthly values of t vary between 0.03 (Hall and Milgrom, 2008) and
0.036 (Pissarides, 2009).
10There is a wide range of alternative calibrated values for g in the literature. Hagedorn
and Manovskii (2008) use a weekly vacancy cost of .. Hall (2005) assumes a monthly cost
of . while Pissarides (2009) assumes .. Our use of a relatively small vacancy posting
cost gives ®rms a greater incentive to post vacancies; our ®nding of a low rate of vacancy
setting, and therefore a high vacancy ®lling rate, is therefore noteworthy.
11 In the literature, values of b vary between 0.4 (Shimer, 2005) and 0.955 (Hagedorn and
Mankovskii 2008).
12Pissarides (2009) sets m  .	 in his monthly based calibration. The quarterly equivalent
of this is m  .
.
13The volatlities of y and s are . and .	 respectively, while their auotcorrelations
are .	 and .	. These are the same as the corresponding values in Shimer (2005).
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 that match average values observed in the data. For the target steady-state
unemployment rate, we use u = 0.058, the average unemployment rate from
1955 to 2003. For target steady-state labour market tightness, we follow Hall
and Milgrom (2008)    = 0.5 	
 JOLTS data14. The results are
shown in Table 2). We ®nd the closest match to our targeted values of u and
 when d = 0.94 and e = 0.0615 . With these calibrated parameter values, we
obtain steady-state values of u = 0.063 and  = 0.504, close to the targeted
values. We also ®nd a monthly average job ®nding rate of f = 0.497. This is
close to the value of f = 0.517 reported by Hall and Milgrom (2008)16 . Thus
our model also provides a good ®t to this non-targeted variable. Dividing the
simulated job ®nding rate by the simulated value of , we obtain the implied
average vacancy ®lling rate in the model as q = 0.986. As discussed above, the
high rate of vacancy ®lling implies that variations in the number of vacancies
posted leads to large variations in unemployment.
Table 2 Values of Endogenous Variables for Calibration
Parameter Interpretation U.S Data This Paper
u Unemployment Rate 0.058 0.063
 Labour Market Tightness 0.500 0.504
f Job Finding Rate 0.517 0.497
Source: Unemployment Rate, BLS data, 1955Q1-2003Q4
Labour Market Tightness, JOLTS data, see Hall and Milgrom (2008)
Job Finding Rate, JOLTS data, see Hall and Milgrom (2008)
Using our calibrated parameters values and the value of f in Table 2) we
obtain w = 0.99 from the wage equation in (18). Thus the relatively small
friction from shirking eects implied by our values of e and d implies a low
level of pro®t for ®rms. The implications of this will be explored in section 3.4)
below.
 
Column (i) of Table 3) shows the observed volatilities of the unemployment
rate, vacancies, labour market tightness and the job ®nding rate in US data
14Labour market tightness is hard to calibrate (Elsby et al, 2013). Shimer (2005) assumes
that q  
 in steady-state and uses this assumption to derive a measure of vacancy costs.
15Combining (10) and (18) in steady-state, the ®rms optimality condition is

- r  t g
m
qa  b c e
e
d
r  t mq-a
Substituting the other parameter values from Table 1) and the target value of q from Table
2), this can be written as
.
  e
 

.
d

The solution to this requires a small value of e and a large value of d.
16Hall and Milgrom (2008) report that the daily job ®nding rate should be 2.4%. The
monthly equivalent of this is .
	.
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reported in Shimer (2005); column (ii) shows the simulated volatilities from our
model; columns (iii)-(iv) show, for comparison, the simulation results reported
by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) and Shimer (2005). The volatility of unem-
ployment in the data is 0.190; in our simulations it is 0.190. The volatilities of
vacancies, labour market tightness and the job ®nding rate in the data are 0.202,
0.382 and 0.118 respectively; the corresponding simulated volatilities are 0.206,
0.370 and 0.185. It is thus clear that our model is able to match the observed
volatilities in the data well17 , much better than the simulations of the standard
search frictions model reported in Shimer (2005). Comparison with the volatili-
ties reported by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) is complicated by the fact that
they use a less volatile (and less autocorrelated) measure of productivity than
Shimer (2005)18 ; a feature that lowers the simulated labour market volatilities
in their model. The ratio of their simulated unemployment volatility to the
volatility of productivity they use is 11.2. This ratio is 9.5 in our simulations.
This compares to empirical ratios of 9.5 and 9.6 reported by Shimer (2005) and
Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) respectively.
Table 3 Volatilities
Standard Deviation U.S Data This Paper Hagedorn Standard DMP
of Key Labour and Model
Market Variables Shimer (2005) Manovskii (2008) Shimer (2005)
u 0.190 0.190 0.145 0.031
v 0.202 0.206 0.169 0.011
 0.382 0.370 0.292 0.037
f 0.118 0.185  0.014
The simulated job ®nding rate is more volatile than the data indicates.
Therefore the model places too much emphasis on job creation, and too little
emphasis on job destruction, in explaining business cycle movements in labour
market variables19 . Nonetheless, the over-prediction of this volatility on our
model is much smaller than the under-prediction in the standard search fric-
tions model.
 

   
 
    
Since unemployment, vacancies and the job-®nding rate can be expressed as
functions of labour market tightness (eg Shimer, 2005), the volatility of labour
17Similar results are obtained if we supress separations shocks. This is line with the liter-
ature, which ®nds that these shocks have little role in explaining cyclical movements in key
labour market variables
18 They follow Shimer (2005) in using a Hodrick-Prescott ®lter, but use a much smaller
smoothing parameter.
19Exogenous job separations have little eect on labour market tightness. Therefore highly
volatile labour market tightness requires large volatility in job creation. Given the relatively
low levels of vacancies in the model, this create the excess volatility in the job ®nding rate
documented in Table 3).
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market tightness relative to the volatility of productivity shocks is at the core
of the unemployment volatility puzzle. In steady-state, this relative volatil-
ity equals the elasticity of labour market tightness with respect to output
(Mortensen and Nagypal, 2007). This elasticity has therefore become central to
the debate on the volatility puzzle.
In this debate, emphasis is placed on the elasticity of wages with respect
to output (stressed by Shimer, 2005, in his explanation of why the canonical
search frictions model failed to match the data, also see Hall, 2005, and Hall
and Milgrom, 2008) and on the rate of pro®t (eg Mortensen and Nagypal, 2007,
and Hagedorn and Manovskii, 2008). To analyse the role of these factors, we
can express the ®rms optimality condition in steady-state as
y = w + l (20)
where l = grq . This implies
y, = (1 p)w, + pl, (21)
where y, w, and l, are respectively the elasticities of output, wages and
hiring costs with respect to labour market tightness and p = ywy is the rate of
pro®t. Using (14) and the de®nition of l, l, = a. Since w, = w,yy,, (21)
can be written as
y, = (1 p)w,yy, + ap (22)
and so
,y =
1 (1 p)w,y
ap
(23)
Equation (23) shows how the factors highlighted in the existing literature, the
elasticity of wages with respect to output and the rate of pro®t, interact to
determine the elasticity of labour market tightness with respect to output. We
note that this elasticity is larger when wages are less responsive to output and
when the rate of pro®t is smaller20 . We also note that the wage elasticity
has   impact if the rate of pro®t is small; this supports Hagedorn and
Manovskiis assertion that the wage elasticity only matters relative to the rate
of pro®t.
  
  
 
Using (18), ¶w¶ =

d
¶f
¶ or, since f = q,
¶w
¶ =

dq(1 +

q
¶q
¶ ). Using (14), this
implies
w, = (1 a) e
d
f
(1 p) (24)
Combining this with (21), we obtain
,y =
1
(1 a) df + ap
(25)
20We note that
¶eq,y
¶ew,y
 - -p
ap
<  and
¶eq,y
¶p
 - -ew,y
ap
< , (if w,y < 
).
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Using our parameter values and the average values of f from Table 2), the
elasticity of labour market tightness with respect to the productivity shock is
17.89. This is close to the ratio of the volatility of labour market tightness to
the volatility of productivity shocks in Table 2).
In our model, productivity shocks are transmitted to labour market
tightness through their impact on wages and on pro®ts (the ®rst term in the
denominator of (25) contains the impact of productivity on wages, while the
second term in the denominator contains the impact of productivity on pro®ts)
Equation (25) shows that our model is able to generate a large volatility of
labour market tightness because of a small value of d and a small rate of pro®t.
This latter point is consistent with arguments in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008)
that a large volatility of labour market tightness requires a low rate of pro®t.
Low pro®ts induce ®rms to put relatively few resources into recruiting, leading
to a low level of labour market tightness and a high vacancy ®lling rate. This
in turn implies that variations in vacancies in response to productivity shocks
are transmitted strongly into variations in unemployment
Using
w,y = (1 a)me
d

1 p ,y (26)
with our calibrated parameters values, we obtain w,y = 0.9. This is close to
empirical values reported by Pissarides (2009). Thus a weak response of wages
to output is not central to the ability of our model to generate large volatilities
of unemployment and output.
  
  
 
The comparison with the standard search frictions model is useful here. Using
(19) to write
¶w
¶
= 
¶y
¶
+ g (27)
we obtain
w, =

1 p (y, + g) (28)
Combining this with (21), we obtain
,y =
1

g +
a
p
(29)
Using (19), this is
,y =
1

 (1 a)g + a(1 b c)
(30)
Using the calibrated parameters in Table 1) and following Shimer (2005) in
assuming  = 0.72, the elasticity of labour market tightness with respect to
the productivity shock is 4.48; if we follow most of the existing literature and
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assume  = 0.5, the elasticity is 1.74. Both values are considerably smaller
than the volatility observed in the data. As noted by Hagedorn and Makovskii
(2008), the standard search frictions model can only match empirical volatilities
by making the assumptions that workers have very little bargaining power and
that the value of leisure is large. The impact of these assumptions is clear from
(29). Low bargaining power of workers makes the ®rst term in the denominator
small while high value of leisure reduces the size of the second term21.
  
   

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One prominent response to the volatility puzzle is the strategic wage bargain (eg
Hall and Milgrom, 2008). The strategic wage bargain switches the bargainers
threat point from terminating the bargain to extending the bargain. This switch
implies that the cost of delay in wage negotiations replaces the workers outside
option as a driving force in wage formation. Assuming a large ®xed cost of delay
reduces the wage elasticity and so delivers a large elasticity of labour market
tightness with respect to output. The model might be criticised both for the
assumption that the cost of delay is large (Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2016) and
for the assumption that this cost is acyclical (if the cost of delay to the ®rm is
pro-cyclical, re¯ecting lost output, then the threat point becomes pro-cyclical
and so the resulting wage becomes more sensitive to output).
  

 
Ljungqvist and Sargent (2016) argue that all proposed solutions to the unem-
ployment volatility puzzle require a small value for the "fundamental surplus",
the "upper bound on the fraction of a jobs output that the invisible hand can
allocate to vacancy creation"; this is equivalent to the lowest value of the wage
that is consistent with (20). Ljungqvist and Sargent (2016) express the elasticity
of labour market tightness with respect to the productivity shock as
¶
¶y
y

= G
y
y  x (31)
where x is the fundamental surplus and yxy is the fundamental surplus share.
In our model, the no-shirking constraint gives the lowest wage that is consistent
with positive output, so x = w and so the fundamental surplus share is simply
the rate of pro®t. We can show that G = rgarga ed fq . As with (25),
the low rate of pro®t in our model generates a large volatility of labour market
tightness. In the standard search frictions model, the fundamental surplus is
x = b + c, as this is the lowest value of the wage that is consistent with non-
zero output. In this case, G = rfarf . The inability of the standard search
frictions model to address the volatility puzzle is re¯ected in the relatively small
21Amaral et al (2016) raise concerns about the parameterisation of Hagedorn and Makovskii
(2008), arguing that their results rely on a small elasticity of wages, contrary to evidence
including Pissarides (2009).
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values of G and x obtained by Ljungqvist and Sargent (2016) using standard
calibrations. The value of yyx is only large enough to generate substantial
volatility in  when the value of b+c is assumed to be large, following Hagedorn
and Makovskii (2008). In the case of the strategic bargaining model of Hall and
Milgrom (2008) (see also Christiano et al, 2016), the fundamental surplus is
x = b + c + r g, where g is the ®xed cost of delay incurred by the ®rm; in
this case, G = a . Ljungqvist and Sargent (2016) argue that a large cost of delay
is required to generate a large volatility of labour market tightness.
 
 
 

Table 4) presents the autocorrelations of key labour market variables. Col-
umn (i) shows the observed autocorrelations of the unemployment rate, va-
cancies, labour market tightness and the job ®nding rate in US data reported
in Shimer (2005); column (ii) shows the simulated autocorrelations from our
model; columns (iii)-(iv) show, for comparison, the simulation results reported
by Shimer (2005) and Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008). Our model is better able
to match the autocorrelation of vacancies observed in the data. Shimer (2005)
reports an autocorrelation of 0.291 for vacancies and Hagedorn and Manovskii
(2008) report 0.575. The autocorrelation of vacancies in our model is 0.866,
closer than alternative models to the observed value. Our model is able to
match the high persistence of vacancies in the data because the low rate of
pro®t in our model makes vacancy creation highly sensitive to output and thus
the persistence of vacancies matches the high rate of persistence of output.
Table 4 Quarterly Autocorrelation of Key Labour Market Variables
Key Labour U.S Data This Paper Hagedorn and Standard DMP
Market Variables Shimer (2005) Manovskii (2008) Shimer (2005)
u 0.936 0.853 0.830 0.933
v 0.940 0.866 0.575 0.291
 0.941 0.878 0.751 0.878
f 0.908 0.878  0.878
Table 5) presents the correlations between unemployment, vacancies, labour
market tightness and the job ®nding rate obtained from simulations of our
model and compares these to correlations in US data and to those reported
by Shimer (2005) and Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008). Our model produces
similar correlations to Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) and delivers a relatively
close match to the data. For example, Shimer (2005) reports a correlation
between unemployment and vacancies of -0.427, compared to -0.894 in the data.
In our model, this correlation is -0.747, similar to the value of -0.724 reported
by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008). This relatively high correlation re¯ects the
high vacancy ®lling rate in our model, which implies that variations in vacancies
lead to similar variations in unemployment.
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Table 5 Correlations of Key Labour Market Variables
u v  f
U.S Data u 1 -0.894 -0.971 -0.949
This Paper u 1 -0.747 -0.929 -0.929
Shimer (2005) u 1 -0.427 -0.964 -0.964
H&M (2008) u 1 -0.724 -0.916 
US Data v  1 0.975 0.897
This Paper v  1 0.940 0.940
Shimer (2005) v  1 0.650 0.650
H&M (2008) v  1 0.940 
U.S Data    1 0.948
This Paper    1 1
Shimer (2005)    1 1
H&M (2008)    1 
 


This paper has developed a modi®ed version of the standard search frictions
model developed by Diamond (1982), Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and Pis-
sarides (2000), introducing a shirking mechanism and assuming that ®rms post
wages. Simulations of the model show a close match to the observed volatilities,
correlations and autocorrelations of unemployment, vacancies, labour market
tightness and the job ®nding rate in US data. The model is better able to
match key features of the data than prominent alternative models that have
been proposed in response to the unemployment volatility puzzle. The key
mechanism underlying these results is that even a small shirking eect leads to
a small rate of proft. This leads to a low rate of vacancy creation which, since
vacancies are low relative to the number of unemployed workers, implies a high
vacancy ®lling rate. This in turn implies that hiring is highly sensitive to the
number of vacancies; as a consequence, variations in job vacancies in response to
shocks lead to large variations in unemployment. Since a low rate of pro®t also
implies that vacancies are highly sensitive to ouput, unemployment is highly
sensitive to productivity shocks.
This analysis could be developed in several ways. We might investigate
whether the ability to generate high volatility of key labour market variables
is a generic property of eYciency wage models. This paper has argued that a
combination of wage posting with a mechansim to ensure low profts can gen-
erate a large volatility of unemployment and other labour market variables. In
principle, all eYciency wage models share this feature. This paper extends the
model of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) to a search frictions context. One might
similarly extend models in which in which eort is a continuous function of
the wage rather than binary (Solow, 1979) and examine whether these can also
generate high levels of labour market volatility.
We can also develop our analysis by investigating whether the model has
explanatory power beyond the average characteristics of the the US labour mar-
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ket. There are two aspects to this. First, we can analyse the performance of the
model in dierent environments, for example in the European labour market
where the vacancy-®lling rate is lower than in the US. Doing so has proved a
challenge for existing models of serach frictions (eg Amaral and Tasci, 2016).
Second, we might use our model to address the changes in the cyclicality of the
US and other labour markets that have been identi®ed by, among others, Gali
and van Rens (2014), in which the volatility of employment and wages has in-
creased. Some explanations of this point to the increase in wage contracts that
are linked to performance (eg Lemieux et al, 2009). An analysis based around
the incentives of workers to supply eort may well be able to contribute to this
debate.
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